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Sparrow and Lucas: When Robots Rule the Waves?

WHEN ROBOTS RULE THE WAVES?
Robert Sparrow and George Lucas

R

obotic weapons are widely believed to be the future of war.1 Dramatic progress in the science and engineering of robotics, alongside the perceived success of the U.S. Predator and Reaper drones in Iraq and Afghanistan, has led many
commentators to conclude that the wars of the twenty-first century increasingly
will be fought, by industrialized nations at least, using remotely piloted and autonomous weapon systems (AWSs).2 This belief also is playing an important role
in shaping the thinking and practice of militaries around the world, which are
scrambling to purchase drones and to develop and deploy robots for both combat
and combat-support roles. Thus, for instance, all
Robert Sparrow received his BA from the University of
Melbourne and his PhD from the Australian National the U.S. armed services have published “roadmap”
University and is presently at Monash University. At documents detailing ambitious plans to integrate
Monash he is a professor in the philosophy program, a
unmanned systems (UMSs) into their forces.3
chief investigator in the Australian Research Council
The new enthusiasm for robots in military and
Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, and
an adjunct professor in the Centre for Human Bio- policy circles has led to philosophers and ethicists
ethics. He has authored numerous papers and book
paying increased attention to issues surrounding
chapters on the ethics of military robotics, just war
the military uses of robots. In particular, there is
theory, human enhancement, and nanotechnology.
He is a co-chair of the IEEE Technical Committee on
now a flourishing literature on the ethics of drone
Robot Ethics and was one of the founding members of
warfare and an emerging literature on the ethics of
the International Committee for Robot Arms Control.
George Lucas received his BS from the College of the development and deployment of autonomous
4
William and Mary and his PhD from Northwestern weapon systems. However, the high profile of
University. He is professor emeritus at the U.S. Naval
aerial drones in the public eye—along with the
Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He is
the author of the book Military Ethics: What Every- fact that these are the systems that have seen most
one Needs to Know.
active service—has led to the latter literature focusing almost entirely on the ethical issues raised
© 2016 by Robert Sparrow and George Lucas
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2016, Vol. 69, No. 4
by autonomous uninhabited aerial vehicles and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

1

50

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 7

uninhabited combat aerial vehicles. To date there has been comparatively little
discussion of the ethical issues raised by the prospect of autonomous submersibles or autonomous surface vessels.5
We believe it is high time that philosophers and military ethicists begin to
address this lacuna, especially given the rapid development and military potential of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned
surface vehicles (USVs).6 Moreover, we believe that there are a number of ethical
dilemmas specific to these technologies by virtue of the distinctive character of
war at sea. This paper represents its two authors’ initial attempt to collaborate
—from somewhat contrasting ideological perspectives—in surveying and discussing these issues. We suggest that a number of unique and complex ethical
questions are likely to arise regarding the applications of autonomous UUVs and
USVs, including the following:
1. Should armed autonomous UUVs and USVs be understood (as the
comparatively modest body of legal literature to date has posed the
problem) as “vessels” or as “weapons”?
2. With what sorts of operations might autonomous UUVs and USVs
legitimately be tasked in international, as opposed to territorial, waters?
3. Is the operation of armed autonomous systems compatible with freedom
of navigation in international waters?
4. What is the capacity of future maritime and underwater autonomous
systems, when weaponized, to abide by the requirements of distinction
and proportionality in naval warfare?
5. What are the implications, with regard to the design and the ethics of the
use of autonomous UUVs and USVs, of customary maritime duties, e.g.,
toward persons lost at sea?
Several of these issues may stand as significant barriers to the ethical deployment of autonomous UUVs and USVs, in some roles at least, for the foreseeable
future.7
Our investigation of these questions proceeds through eight sections. In section 1, we provide a brief account of our reasons for believing that unmanned
systems will come to play an increasingly vital role in future naval combat, and,
by way of illustration, we introduce briefly a number of UUVs and USVs already
deployed by the U.S. Navy or currently under development. In section 2, we argue
that war at sea has a distinctive ethical character. Consequently, the use of unmanned—and especially autonomous—systems in this context may generate ethical issues that the larger discussion of the ethics of unmanned systems may have
missed. Section 3 highlights the importance of a question about the appropriate
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/7

NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb 50

2

9/15/16 12:47 PM

Sparrow and Lucas: When Robots Rule the Waves?

S PA R R O W & LU C A S

51

way to conceptualize armed USVs and UUVs. We suggest that whether we think
of particular systems as “vessels” or “weapons” will have implications for our
understanding of the ethics of their applications, beyond merely the distinct legal regimes that apply to each, which we explore further in subsequent sections.
Section 4 examines a range of issues that will arise about the operations of UUVs
and USVs in different sorts of waters (e.g., territorial, international). In particular, we examine at length the implications of the operations of armed AWSs for
freedom of navigation on the high seas. We then turn, in section 5, to discussing the ethical issues raised by the requirements of the principle of distinction
for the operation of AWSs. While there are a number of reasons to believe that
distinction poses fewer problems for AWSs on and under the seas than in other
domains of warfare, we highlight the existence of four different cases in which it
nevertheless remains a profound challenge. Section 6 considers the question of
proportionality. As was the case with distinction, there are some reasons to expect proportionality calculations regarding civilian casualties to be easier in the
context of war at sea than in other forms of warfare. However, once we acknowledge that both damage to the environment and enemy combatant casualties are
relevant to the ethical (if not the legal) requirement of proportionality, even at
sea proportionality also looks very difficult for machines. Section 7 complexifies the discussion of the preceding two sections by considering the standard of
compliance with the principles of distinction and proportionality that we should
require of AWSs; the possibility that maintaining a human being “in the loop”
(or perhaps “on the loop”) could prevent attacks on illegitimate targets; and the
implications of the UMS for the requirement of “precautions in attack.” In section
8 we discuss the implications of the duty of rescue that exists in the context of war
at sea for the design and applications of UUVs and USVs. We suggest that the
fact that coming to the rescue of combatants lost at sea would not risk the lives
of the crew in the case of UMSs means that the duty of rescue may be especially
stringent on such systems; on the other hand, unless they are designed to possess the capacity to rescue, they may have no such obligation. It will be especially
important therefore to think through the question of the obligations on UMSs in
war at sea when it comes to rescue before many (more) such systems are designed
and deployed. Finally, by way of a conclusion, we offer some brief remarks about
the overall nature of our discussion and some suggestions for productive lines of
inquiry for further research.
SECTION 1: ROBOTIC WEAPONS FOR WAR ON AND
UNDER THE SEA
While aerial drones may have been hogging the limelight thus far when it comes
to the military uses of robotics, there is currently an enormous amount of interest
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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in the development and application of remotely piloted, semiautonomous and
autonomous weapons to fight wars on and under the sea.8
The existence of waves, currents, tides, and submerged obstacles and the difficulties of maintaining reliable communications through water in some ways
make the oceans a more difficult environment for robots than the air. However,
remaining afloat or submerged at a given depth is less technically demanding
than remaining airborne, and surface vessels need to move in only two dimensions rather than the three required of aerial vehicles. The relatively small
number of terrain types in war at sea and the virtual nonexistence of legitimate
commercial traffic beneath the sea, as well as the fact that blue-water operations
often may proceed without regard to concerns about running aground, also mean
that for robots the oceans are a more tractable environment in which to conduct
warfare than is the land.
Moreover, the results that might be achieved through the further development
and deployment of UUVs and USVs are substantial. Operations at sea—especially
underwater—are always dangerous, often dull, and often dirty, at least in the
sense of being uncomfortable for and wearing on those involved. As such, many
missions at sea are well suited to being assigned to robots. As we discuss further
below, the military advantages to be secured by the development of autonomous
systems for war on and under the seas, in particular, are enormous.9
For all these reasons, we expect that naval operations will be the next frontier
for the development and deployment of robotic weapons in the coming decade(s).
As we are most familiar with the U.S. UUV and USV programs, we will support
and illustrate this claim with a brief discussion of the U.S. Navy’s progress in this
area. However, a number of countries currently are developing such systems.10
A graphical overview of the U.S. Navy’s inventory of systems at the time of
writing may be found in Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013–38.
Surface Vessels
Unmanned surface vehicles have enormous potential in naval operations, although this potential is just beginning to be explored. The fact that these UMSs
operate on the surface means that maintaining a human being in (or on) the
loop is more feasible than it is for submersibles. Nevertheless, as in the case of
UMSs more generally, there are still powerful military and economic dynamics
pushing toward the development of systems that are capable of fully autonomous
operations.
The U.S. USV inventory already includes a number of systems of different
sizes and intended for different roles, with more under development. Navy scientists are using self-propelled, self-guided, and self-sufficient “wave gliders”
(essentially modified solar- and wave-powered surfboards) manufactured by
Liquid Robotics to gather meteorological and oceanographic data; in the future
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/7
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these systems might be used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) missions.11 The U.S. Navy has trialed USVs for maritime security and fleet
protection. The Spartan Scout is a rigid-hull (aluminum) inflatable boat that is
capable of remote-controlled and semiautonomous operations. Software called
CARACaS (for “Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing”), which allows one human supervisor to oversee the operations of a number of USVs, has been used to provide USVs with the capacity for swarming to
intercept enemy vessels.12 Of course, the same systems might serve as weapons
platforms that could be deployed in aggressive forward postures without placing
crews at risk. The U.S. Navy tested a version of Spartan Scout armed with .50
caliber machine guns as early as 2002 and successfully demonstrated the firing of missiles from it in 2012.13 The technology that makes possible defensive
swarming also enables unmanned craft to swarm offensively, with the aim of
overwhelming enemy ship-based defenses.
The U.S. Navy is also actively interested in developing an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability using USVs. The Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) has responded to the threat posed to U.S. vessels by the new
generation of quiet diesel submarines by initiating a program to build and test
an autonomous trimaran capable of tracking submerged enemy submarines for
extended periods.14 The Anti-submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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Vessel, or “Sea Hunter,” is currently scheduled for trials beginning in 2016; the
key navigational and collision-avoidance systems for this vessel underwent successful trials using a test boat in January 2015.15 Should this project come to
fruition, we would expect to see extended-range autonomous navigation and
collision-avoidance capabilities rolled out to any number of other surface vessels.
Submersibles
Submarine operations are notoriously dangerous, so removing human crews
from submersibles wherever possible is arguably a moral imperative; it also has a
number of other benefits. Because unmanned systems carry no crew, they can be
significantly smaller than the manned systems required to carry out similar operations. This permits UUVs to operate more quietly, for longer periods, and with
a longer range. Autonomous UUVs, in particular, show enormous potential for
operating for very long periods without needing to surface to replenish oxygen
or fuel supplies or to return to base to rotate crews. This renders them ideal for
roles in which the capacity to loiter undetected is an advantage. Indeed, because
any emissions risk giving away two of the most vital secrets of a submersible—its
presence and its location—the capacity to operate autonomously is a requirement
for an effective unmanned submersible.
It is therefore no surprise that the U.S. Navy has an ambitious program of
research and development of UUVs, especially autonomous UUVs, as well as a
number of existing systems already deployed. For reasons of space, we will discuss only a few of these.16
UUVs’ capacities for stealth and for use in circumstances in which it might be
too expensive or dangerous to deploy a manned vessel make them ideal for ISR.
Almost every UUV we have seen discussed in the literature is advertised as having a valuable role to play in ISR. For instance, the Sea Maverick and Sea Stalker
UUVs (see the figure) are small(ish) semiautonomous submarines intended to
carry out reconnaissance missions in depths of up to one thousand feet.17 The
Littoral Battlespace Sensing-Glider uses an innovative propulsion system involving changes of buoyancy to travel the oceans for up to a month at a time and
return oceanographic data useful for submarine warfare.18 The U.S. Navy also
is experimenting with more-speculative systems such as the Cyro jellyfish, with
the thought that a network of small, submersible, low-cost but hard-to-detect
systems could provide valuable intelligence on enemy activities in contested
waters.19
Similarly, UUVs have an obvious utility in countermine warfare, which role
can be especially dangerous for manned vehicles. The U.S. Navy possesses a number of systems intended to perform this function, including the Mark 18 (Mod
1) Swordfish, the Mark 18 (Mod 2) Kingfish, and the Littoral Battlespace Sensing
autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), all derived from variants of the Remote
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/7
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Environmental Monitoring Unit System (known as REMUS) AUV manufactured
by Hydroid, as well as the AN/BLQ-11 autonomous unmanned underwater vehicle (formerly called the Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System), which may be
launched from the torpedo tubes of Los Angeles– and Virginia-class submarines.20
The mine countermeasures package for the littoral combat ship is based around
an autonomous remote multimission vehicle (RMMV) that detects mines with a
variable-depth, towed-array sonar.21
Importantly, as we discuss further below, armed UUVs themselves share much
in common with naval mines (what is an autonomous torpedo but a “swimming”
mine?) and may be used in a similar role. Indeed, mine warfare is on the verge
of a profound revolution, made possible by the capacity to separate the sensor
packages that detect enemy vessels from the submerged ordnance that is tasked
with destroying them. While the U.S. Mk 60 encapsulated torpedo (CAPTOR)
deepwater mine already had provided proof-in-principle of this possibility, recent innovations in sensors, marine propulsion, and autonomous navigation have
expanded the prospects for development of such systems radically. In the future,
nations may defend themselves—or deny the sea to others—using large arrays of
networked sensors that communicate targeting information directly to a smaller
number of autonomous armed UUVs lurking in the depths nearby.22
Finally, perhaps the most ambitious set of roles anticipated for any UUV consists of those the large-displacement unmanned underwater vehicle (LDUUV) is
supposed to fulfill. The LDUUV is an experimental autonomous submarine intended to be able to navigate and operate under water for extended periods after
being launched from a shore-based facility, an appropriately equipped nuclear
submarine, or a surface vessel. The tasks envisioned for it include underwater
reconnaissance and mine countermeasures, but extend to carrying and deploying
smaller UUVs, or even to launching aerial drones for surface reconnaissance.23
The U.S. Department of Defense recently announced a tender process to provide
LDUUVs with an ASW capability.24
It is clear that the ultimate conclusion of the technology trajectory being explored in this system is a fully autonomous submersible capable of the same range
of operations as a manned submarine.25 In the discussion that follows, it is often
the LDUUV, including future developments thereof, that we have in mind when
we discuss the issues raised by the prospect of armed autonomous UUVs.
SECTION 2: THE DISTINCTIVE ETHICAL CHARACTER OF
WAR AT SEA
There has been a small but productive discussion in the literature concerning the
legal status of UUVs and USVs.26 However, to date there has been little discussion of the ethical issues these systems raise. Our concern here is primarily with
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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the latter topic. Insofar as legal instruments reflect, at least in part, the existing
consensus on the duties and obligations of those whose activities they govern, we
sometimes will refer to legal texts and precedents in the course of our argument.
Nevertheless, we write in the conviction that the law does not exhaust ethics.
Not only do provisions of the law fail to address ethical concerns, but those very
legal constraints may pose moral dilemmas that will need to be addressed in
operational policy and naval warfare strategy. In addition, there may be obvious
ethical demands on warfighters that are yet to be codified in law. Indeed, there
may be activities that are legally permitted but morally impermissible.27 Ethical
principles may provide useful guidance to warfighters where current law is silent
or lacking. They also may motivate and inform attempts to revise, extend, or
supplement existing law.
One reason to believe that the development of robotic weapons for naval warfare might raise new ethical issues is that war at sea differs in important respects
from war in (most) other environments.28 As a result, the moral norms and
customs that have evolved to regulate naval warfare are arguably more demanding than those regulating warfare elsewhere, are more deeply entrenched in the
consciousness of warfighters, and have distinctive elements.
A full investigation of what is ethically distinctive about naval warfare is beyond the scope of this article. However, a brief excursion into this topic will prove
useful to frame our subsequent discussion. We believe that four features of war at
sea play a key role in shaping the ethical (and legal) codes that regulate the activity of naval combatants.29
(1) In wartime as in peacetime, the sea itself is a deadly adversary of those who
travel on or under it. Even in peacetime, hazards—in the form of strong winds,
rough seas, and hidden reefs—abound, while shipwreck and drowning are everpresent dangers. In wartime, seafarers who are forced to abandon ship after an
enemy attack may find themselves facing nearly certain doom: alone in freezing
waters or floating in a small life raft, and thousands of miles from land.
(2) Because of the hostile nature of the marine environment, life at sea is primarily a collective life, one in which men (and increasingly women) are thrown
together in a mutual endeavor framed by the possibility of misadventure.30 Few
people go to sea by themselves. Rather, people go to sea together in vessels, and
therein form miniature—or, on modern capital ships, quite large—societies in
the midst of a hostile environment.
These first two facts already have two important consequences for ethical
understandings regarding war at sea.
First, the collective nature of life at sea and the shared vulnerability of all seafarers to misadventure and drowning mean that a strong expectation of mutual
aid has grown up among those who go to sea. In particular, all those who go
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/7
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to sea are understood to have a duty to come to the aid of those who are lost at
sea, whenever it is possible to do so without serious danger to themselves. This
duty transcends ordinary national loyalties and has no direct analogue in land
warfare.31 The development of this expectation may be accounted for as a function of the need for a form of social insurance for this risky endeavor; each and
every person at sea is safer if there is an expectation that everyone will come to
the rescue of anyone as required, and consequently it is in each and every individual’s interest if this expectation is promulgated widely and failures to live up
to it are subject to sanctions, both formal and informal. Obviously, war—and the
dehumanization of the enemy that often accompanies it—places this expectation
under stress. Nevertheless, because enemy sailors in the water are no longer combatants, by virtue of being hors de combat, and because the risk of being in need
of rescue is higher for all seamen during wartime, the expectation remains that
vessels will render aid to, and will attempt to rescue, individuals lost at sea regardless of their nationality when they have the capacity to do so and as long as doing
so would not jeopardize the safety of the vessel and those on board.32 Moreover, the
extent to which all those who go to sea share a distinct way of life compared with
those who remain on land—and the solidarity that this encourages—along with
the constant danger posed by the sea to all combatants ensures that this duty of
rescue remains central to maritime culture, even in wartime.33
Second, the ethical and legal codes that govern war at sea are primarily concerned with the activities and fates of “vessels.” As the operations of a ship are the
result of a cooperative activity, it is often not possible to distinguish between the
intentions of the commanding officer and that of his or her crew. Nor is it usually
possible to attack some persons on board a vessel without targeting the vessel as
a whole and thus risking the lives of everyone aboard. For these reasons, seamen
literally sink or swim together. Thus, it is both natural and appropriate that the
vessel be the primary locus of attention in ethical (as well as legal) deliberation
about naval warfare.
Two other features of war at sea are important to bear in mind when thinking about ethics in that context. These concern the unique relationship between
combatants and noncombatants in naval combat.
(3) The sea is more sparsely populated than the land, and in wartime the vessels that sail on or under it divide more or less naturally into those that are participating actively in the conflict and those that are not.34 That is to say, especially
with the benefits of modern sensor packages, military vessels are distinguished
more easily from civilian vessels than groups of armed men are distinguished
from civilians in land warfare, and it is more difficult for combatants to hide
among the noncombatant population. Thus, with the exception of merchant
vessels (of which, more below), which might have been pressed into service to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
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carry cargo or personnel for military purposes, it is generally much easier to
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate targets at sea than it is in other forms of
warfare.35
On the other hand, (4) the comparatively featureless nature of the oceans and
the lack of local geographical references for national and other relevant political
boundaries mean that it is harder to separate combatants and noncombatants
geographically. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that oceangoing commerce is essential to the flourishing—and even to the survival—of modern nations, with the consequence that, even during wartime, merchants will continue
to ply the seas with their goods and passenger ships and ferries will continue to
transport civilians.36 At least partly in recognition of this fact, the high seas remain a “commons,” owned by no one and available for use by everyone.
These latter two features of war at sea have led to the development of a sophisticated set of practices and agreements around the activities of belligerent
and neutral parties intended to allow neutral parties to continue to navigate the
seas peacefully even when wars are being fought. Customary international law
relating to naval warfare attempts to balance the competing demands of national
sovereignty and freedom of navigation, and distinguishes among belligerent
and neutral nations’ internal waters, territorial waters, and exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) as well as the high seas, and places limits on the sorts of activities
that legitimately may be pursued in each.37 As we shall see below, understanding
the competing considerations informing these treaties also will prove useful to
resolving ethical issues relating to the areas and roles in which UUVs and USVs
legitimately may be deployed.
We do not want to exaggerate the extent to which the ethics of war at sea differs from the ethics of fighting wars in other environments. The fundamental
moral framework for naval warfare, as for land or air warfare, is outlined in just
war theory. The special features we have highlighted here may be accounted for
as consequences of the application of just war theory to the peculiar character
of war at sea. Moreover, each of the various features of war at sea highlighted
above may have some counterparts in other domains of warfare.38 Nevertheless,
drawing attention to the way in which the ethics of war at sea is structured by its
special contextual circumstances may productively inform deliberation about the
ethics of the development and deployment of robotic weapons in this context.
SECTION 3: THE STATUS OF ARMED USVS AND UUVS—VESSELS
OR WEAPONS?
As noted above, the legal and ethical codes that govern war at sea are mostly
concerned with the activities of ships and submarines and place demands on

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss4/7
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individuals primarily—although not exclusively—through their roles on these
vessels.
A number of legal authorities already have begun to consider whether or
when UUVs and USVs should be considered “vessels” under the law of the sea.
The emerging consensus seems to be that autonomous UUVs and USVs, at least
above a certain size, should be classed as vessels.39 While remotely piloted vehicles
plausibly might be held to be extensions of the vessel(s) from which they are
operated, systems capable of extended autonomous operations should be understood as vessels in their own right.40
As we shall see below, the question of how we understand USVs and UUVs
is also central to the ethics of their design and application. The more we think
of these systems as autonomous and controlled by an onboard computer, and
the more roles they become capable of fulfilling, the more natural it is to think
of them as vessels. However, as the discussion below highlights, understanding
them as vessels appears to impose demanding ethical requirements on their
capacities and operations, especially relating to distinction, proportionality, and
the duty of rescue.
An alternative way of addressing these requirements, in the light of such conundrums, is to think of armed autonomous USVs and UUVs themselves instead
as weapons, which may be deployed by warfighters, who then become responsible
for ensuring that the use of the weapon meets the requirements of distinction,
proportionality, and so on.41 Yet as we shall see, this way of proceeding generates
its own challenges. An important early finding of our research, then, is that much
work remains to be done to clarify the best way of understanding the status of
armed UUVs and USVs in the context of the larger ethical framework governing
war at sea (as opposed merely to their current legal status).
SECTION 4: DEPLOYMENT—WHERE, WHEN, AND WHY?
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) attempts to balance the
competing claims of national sovereignty and freedom of navigation in peacetime
by distinguishing among different sorts of waters regarding their statuses and the
permissibility of different sorts of activities therein. Customary international law
relating to naval warfare extends this to regulate the relations between belligerent and neutral parties insofar as possible. The research and analysis required to
assess the operations of USVs and UUVs within these frameworks are beginning
to be undertaken now, and some initial results are starting to emerge.42 Thus, for
instance, Andrew Henderson suggests that “UUVs may operate freely in both the
high seas and the EEZ while exercising the requisite due regard for the interests of
other vessels and posing no threat to the territorial integrity of the coastal state”
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and remain submerged while exercising transit passage in international straits
and archipelagic-sea-lanes passage in archipelagic sea-lanes. In territorial seas, he
suggests, UUVs must operate on the surface to exercise the right of innocent passage and display appropriate lights and make sound signals to facilitate safety of
navigation.43 Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger also suggest that USVs and
UUVs would be restricted in the activities they can undertake while exercising
the right of innocent passage.44 Rob McLaughlin emphasizes that USVs and
UUVs are clearly subject to the Convention on the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and must be capable of avoiding collisions to such a degree that they could be said to maintain what he paraphrases
as a “proper and sufficient lookout.” He also allows that the presence of a foreign
submerged UUV within a nation’s territorial waters might constitute a sovereign
affront justifying the use of armed force.45
We leave the task of settling the legal questions raised by the deployment of
UUVs and USVs in various sorts of waters to others qualified to complete it.
However, some discussion of the deeper ethical questions underpinning and surrounding the relevant legal frameworks is appropriate here, and we hope it will
inform the ongoing legal debate usefully.
It does seem reasonable, for instance, that the moral right nations have over
their territorial waters, and to a lesser extent their continental shelves and EEZs,
should allow them to exclude USVs and UUVs conducting—or perhaps just
capable of conducting—certain sorts of operations. If nations have a right to prevent other nations from conducting mining or survey operations in their EEZs
or carrying out operations injurious to their security in their territorial waters,
this right surely would carry over consistently to exclude unmanned vessels just
as much as manned vessels. Indeed, arguably the fact that UUVs and USVs are
unmanned makes their use in these sorts of waters more suspicious and threatening to the interests of sovereign governments, on the assumption that other
nations will be more likely to deploy such vessels in hazardous environments that
might generate a military response, given that doing so will not place a human
crew at risk of death or capture. Requiring such systems to confine themselves
to innocent passage through territorial waters is at least a partial solution to this
problem.
The ethics of the use of autonomous UUVs and USVs on the high seas remains
an open—and controversial—matter. At first sight at least, the right to freedom of
navigation in international waters appears to extend to inclusion of these systems,
presuming that they do not pose too much of a navigational hazard to other vessels. However, interestingly, this presumption rests on an understanding of them
as vessels and may be unsettled when we start to consider the prospect of armed
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autonomous UUVs and USVs and whether such systems should be thought of,
instead, as weapons.
Roughly speaking, the operations of vessels in international waters are permissible as long as they are compatible with the right of free navigation of other
vessels through the same waters. Thus, if they are to operate on the high seas,
UUVs and USVs must have the capacity reliably to avoid posing a hazard to other
vessels. At a bare minimum, this requires taking the appropriate measures to
minimize the risk of collision. While the COLREGs spell this out as requiring all
vessels “at all times [to] maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing”—phrasing that encourages the reader to presume a human being will be on board, or at
least supervising remotely—we can see no reason why a fully autonomous system
that proved equally capable of avoiding collision with other vessels without human supervision should not be judged to meet the appropriate standard.46
Of course, armed UUVs and USVs operating on the high seas would appear to
pose risks to commercial shipping and to the warships of neutral nations beyond
simply the risk of collision; they might (accidentally) fire on them, for example.
Their significance for the right of freedom of navigation is therefore likely to depend on their capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets
of attack, as discussed in sections 5 and 6 below.
A key question in the larger debate about the ethics of autonomous weapons
concerns whether—by analogy to what we suggested was the case with regard
to the capacity to avoid collision—it would be sufficient to render the use of
such weapons permissible if they were capable of achieving results similar to the
standard required of human beings with respect to compliance with the moral
principles of distinction and proportionality. Those inclined to understand the
principles of jus in bello as grounded primarily in a concern for the rights of
noncombatants are likely to believe that this would be sufficient to render the use
of AWSs permissible—and indeed may be tempted to the conclusion that their
use will be mandatory once such weapons become capable of exceeding human
performance in this regard.47 On the other hand, a number of authors have suggested that if we think of the requirements of jus in bello fundamentally as ethical
demands on the human being making the decision to use lethal force, we may
conclude that the absence of a human will at the moment the attack is carried out
means that autonomous weapons cannot be said to comply with these principles
at all.48 Insofar as our concern is with the compatibility of the operations of AWSs
with the right to freedom of navigation rather than with the wider conceptual
debate concerning the ethics of autonomous targeting, though, it appears that
the relevant standard of discrimination is just that required of human beings in
similar circumstances.
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However, there is another reason to worry that achieving a high standard
when it comes to the capacity to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate
targets may not be sufficient to render the use of AWSs ethical on the high seas.
The presence of AWSs operating in particular waters might exercise a “chilling”
effect on commercial shipping over a wide area—and thus impinge on the right
of freedom of navigation—even if the chance of an accidental attack by AWSs
was extremely remote, given the capacities of these systems. This possibility
seems especially likely if we think of autonomous UUVs and USVs as weapons
rather than vessels. Indeed, one well might argue that armed autonomous UUVs
at least should be understood as sophisticated versions of free-floating mines,
and consequently should be prohibited.49 The use of drifting mines that do not
disarm themselves within an hour is prohibited under international law because
of the threat they pose to freedom of navigation.50 The fact that the chance of
any particular ship being struck by any particular drifting mine is small does not
seem to affect the force of this concern.
An important point of reference for our intuitions here is CAPTOR, which is a
moored torpedo-launch system capable of detecting the acoustic signature of approaching enemy submarines and firing a torpedo to destroy them.51 This system
is arguably already autonomous insofar as the “decision” to launch a torpedo is
made without direct human input at the time. Versions of the system have been
in use since 1979 without causing significant international outcry, which suggests
that concerns about freedom of navigation in open waters need not rule out the
deployment of autonomous weapon systems.
However, there are at least three reasons to be cautious about this conclusion. First, because the CAPTOR itself is fixed—even if its range of operations is
extended—the system would appear to pose less of a danger to navigation than
hypothetical free-ranging AWSs.52 Second, insofar as this weapon is advertised
as an antisubmarine system, those plying the surface of the waters may feel they
have little to fear from it. International opinion might be very different should
it become common knowledge that similar systems were being tasked with destroying surface vessels. Finally, the absence of any outcry against CAPTOR and
similar systems needs to be understood in the context of a history over which
they have not been responsible—to date—for any noncombatant casualties. The
first time an AWS deployed at sea attacks a commercial—or, worse, a passenger—
vessel, we might expect public and international opinion about their legitimacy
to change dramatically.
Even very reliable AWSs therefore may jeopardize freedom of navigation if
vessels are unwilling to put to sea in waters in which AWSs are known to be operating. While fear of (accidental) attack by an AWS might appear to be irrational
when compared with the risks that manned systems pose, beliefs about risk are
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notoriously complex and difficult to assess because they often contain hidden
value judgments. In this case, a reluctance to risk attack by an AWS may express
the value judgment that human beings alone should be responsible for decisions
to take human lives. Insofar as the right of freedom of navigation exists to protect
and sustain international commerce, what matters is the willingness of ships to
ply the oceans. Subjective judgments of risk may be just as significant for the existence of freedom of navigation as—indeed, may be more so than—the objective
risks that ships actually take when they leave port.
Therefore, it may turn out that the international community will be required
to adjudicate on the balance of the interests of states in deploying AWSs and the
desire of operators of civilian vessels not to be at risk of attack by an autonomous
weapon. Any attempts to embed this judgment in legislation also will need
to consider what is realistically achievable in this regard, especially given the
military advantages associated with unmanned systems and the force of the logic
driving their uptake. In many ways, such a debate would hark back to that which
took place with the advent of submarine warfare, which effectively was resolved
in favor of permitting the operations of military submersibles. We suspect that
this is the most likely outcome with regard to armed autonomous UUVs and
USVs as well. However, it is important to acknowledge the competing considerations in this debate, summarized above.
A number of further questions may arise concerning the operations of armed
autonomous UUVs and USVs in various waters, but space limitations permit
mere mention of them here. The difficulty in imagining autonomous weapons
having the capacity to capture enemy or neutral vessels suggests that they could
play at most a limited role in naval blockades or taking neutral merchant vessels
as prizes.53 The requirement to record the locations of mines so that they can be
removed or rendered harmless after the cessation of conflict would appear to
be moot, when “mines” are themselves mobile and autonomous.54 However, the
considerations motivating this requirement—reducing the subsequent hazards to
shipping postconflict—imply that autonomous weapons must be able reliably to
render themselves harmless on instruction or after some defined period. There
undoubtedly are other issues that require further investigation.
SECTION 5: DISTINCTION
Perhaps the most fundamental ethical requirement in wartime is to confine one’s
attacks to enemy combatants, and as much as possible to try to avoid civilian
casualties. Thus the jus in bello principle of distinction requires that warfighters
refrain from targeting noncombatants and take appropriate care to minimize the
noncombatant casualties caused by attacks targeted at combatants.
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Much of the current criticism of AWSs proceeds from the claim that robotic
weapons are unlikely to be capable of meeting the requirements of distinction
for the foreseeable future. In counterinsurgency warfare in particular, identifying whether someone is a combatant requires a complex set of contextual judgments that probably will be beyond the capacity of machines for the foreseeable
future.55 Whether this problem is insurmountable or exists in all roles in which
we might imagine AWSs being used is a controversial question that is larger than
we can resolve here. In this context we will settle for observing that the problem
of distinction is arguably less demanding in naval warfare because there are fewer
potential targets and because sonar and radar are more capable of distinguishing
between military and civilian vessels than image recognition, radar, and lidar
(light detection and ranging—“laser radar”) are at distinguishing among targets
in land warfare.56 Indeed, one reason advanced for favoring the use of autonomous systems on or under the sea, especially in blue-water missions, is that, in
comparison with on the land or in the air, on the high seas the “civilian footprint”
is comparatively small, even allowing for commercial shipping and recreational
boating. Moreover, the problem of distinction looks especially tractable in the
context of ASW, given the relative paucity of civilian submarines with tonnages
or acoustic signatures comparable to those of military submarines, and the fact
that those few civilian systems that do exist tend to operate in a limited range of
roles and locations (primarily around oil rigs and submarine cables). Therefore
we might expect that if robots are to become capable of distinction in any context,
they will become capable of it in war on and under the sea.
Nevertheless, there are at least four sorts of cases in which the requirements of
distinction pose a formidable challenge to the ethical operation of autonomous
weapons in naval warfare.
First, to avoid attacks on military ships of neutral nations, AWSs will need to
be able to identify the nature and the nationality of potential targets, not just to
determine that they are warships. In some cases, in which ships of the enemy’s
fleet are easily distinguishable from those of other nations because of distinctive
radar or acoustic profiles, this problem may not arise. However, in some circumstances identifying that a ship carries guns or torpedoes, is of a certain tonnage
or class, or both will not be sufficient to establish that it is an enemy warship.
Instead, making this identification will require the ability to form reasonable
conclusions about its identity on the basis of its historical pattern of activity and
its threat posture within the battle space. One obvious way to solve this problem
would be to program autonomous UUVs and USVs to confine their attacks to
targets that are themselves firing weapons.57 However, this would reduce significantly the military utility of AWSs, especially in strike and area-denial roles.
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Whether computers ever will be able to make the necessary judgments to avoid
the need for this restriction remains an open question.
Second, as enemy vessels that have clearly indicated their surrender are no
longer legitimate targets under the Geneva Convention, AWSs must be able to
recognize surrender.58 It is possible that in the future warships may be expected
to carry a “surrender beacon” capable of communicating to any AWS operating
in the area that in fact they have surrendered. Until that day, however, AWSs will
need to have the capacity to recognize and respond to the communication of
surrender under existing conventions, i.e., through changes in threat posture and
display of signal lights or flags. Again, at this stage it is unclear whether robots
ever will be able to do this reliably.
Third, AWSs must be able to identify when an enemy ship is hors de combat by
virtue of being so badly damaged as to be incapable of posing any military threat.
In rare circumstances it may not be possible for a badly damaged and listing ship
to signal surrender. Thus, morally, if not legally, speaking, even an enemy warship
that has not indicated surrender is not necessarily a legitimate target if it is no
longer capable of engaging in hostilities.59 Human beings are (sometimes) able to
discern when this circumstance applies, using their rich knowledge of the world
and of the motivations and likely actions of people in various situations. Before
the use of AWSs would be ethical, they would need to be at least as capable as
human beings of making such discriminations.
Importantly, these last two issues appear in a different light depending
on whether we think of AWSs as vessels or as weapons. If an enemy warship
surrenders after a torpedo is launched from a manned submarine, for instance,
the ship’s destruction would be a tragedy but not a crime. However, if a ship fires
on an enemy vessel that clearly has indicated surrender, that is a war crime. If we
think of an AWS as a weapon, therefore, then as long as the officer who deploys
it does not do so knowing the intended targets have surrendered or otherwise
become hors de combat, its use will be legitimate even if there is some chance
that the status of its targets may change after it is deployed. On the other hand, if
we think of the USV or UUV as a vessel, then it seems it must have the capacity
to detect whether a potential target has surrendered or otherwise become hors
de combat to avoid attacks in such circumstances. Of course, if the delay between
deploying an AWS understood as a weapon and its carrying out an attack is too
long—a matter of days rather than hours, for instance—this might shake our
conviction that it is sufficiently discriminating to be ethical.60
Fourth, when it comes to operations to interdict or attack merchant shipping,
the problem of distinction is especially challenging just because it is so sensitive to context. AWSs would seem to be poorly suited, for instance, to making

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb 65

17

9/15/16 12:47 PM

66

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 7

judgments about whether merchant vessels are carrying enemy troops or “otherwise making an effective contribution to military action.”61 The fact that AWSs
are unlikely to be capable of searching or capturing merchant ships also limits
their utility in making this discrimination.
SECTION 6: PROPORTIONALITY
The ethical requirements of proportionality under jus in bello ask whether the
military advantage to be gained by an attack on a military target is sufficient
to justify the death and destruction the attack reasonably might be expected
to cause. Importantly, while the legal requirement of proportionality usually is
understood to require only that the noncombatant casualties (“collateral damage”) that it is reasonable to expect an attack on a military target to cause are not
excessive in relation to the military advantage the attack seeks to secure, the ethical principle grants weight to the lives of combatants in this calculation as well.62
Thus, for instance, a deliberate attack on an enemy military installation housing a
large number of enemy warfighters who posed no immediate threat, when it was
already known that the enemy had signed an agreement to surrender effective the
next day, would be unethical by virtue of being disproportionate.
One of us (Sparrow) previously has argued elsewhere that the requirements
of proportionality stand as a profound barrier to the ethical use of AWSs.63 The
calculations of military advantage required to assess whether a given number of
civilian (or military) casualties is proportionate are extremely complex and context sensitive. They require a detailed understanding of the way the world works
that is, Sparrow has argued, likely to remain beyond the capacities of autonomous
systems for the foreseeable future.64 The other of us (Lucas) is less pessimistic,
believing that AWSs’ potential to exceed the limited abilities of human beings
when it comes to making judgments of proportionality is an important part of
their promise.65
Regardless, there are reasons to believe that these sorts of calculations of proportionality are likely to be easier in the context of war at sea. To begin with, as
noted above, the relative lack of civilian “clutter” on the oceans means that the
risk of civilian casualties in attacks on legitimate military targets in naval engagements is much lower than in land warfare, reducing the number of circumstances
in which a judgment of the proportionality of anticipated civilian casualties is
required. There are also typically fewer units involved in naval engagements
than in land warfare and the scope of operations available to individual units is
less, which makes it more plausible to think that a computer could calculate the
military advantage associated with a particular attack and thus whether a given
number of military deaths would be justified.66
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On the other hand, there is another proportionality calculation that is especially difficult in the context of war at sea. Military operations may have significant and long-term implications for civilian life via their impact on the environment.67 Consequently, combatants now are also held to be under an obligation to
consider and, where possible, to minimize the damage to the environment their
activities cause. These obligations must be balanced against considerations of
military necessity. In practice, then, combatants are required to make a calculation of proportionality when contemplating an attack to determine whether the
military advantage the attack will achieve justifies the environmental damage
it is likely to cause. However, the role played by wind, waves, and tides in distributing the debris resulting from war at sea and the complex nature of marine
ecosystems make calculations of the environmental impacts of naval operations
especially difficult. Determination of the intrinsic value of significant features of
the environment (such as, for instance, clean rivers, coral reefs, or the spawning
grounds of fish) is controversial, as is assessment of the instrumental value they
have in terms of their contribution to human well-being. Judgments about such
matters inevitably involve balancing a range of complex considerations as well as
arguments about matters of (moral) value. For both these reasons, calculations
of proportionality in attack in relation to damage to the environment seem likely
to remain beyond the capacity of computers for many years yet.
Thus, once we admit that the marine environment and enemy combatant
casualties are relevant to the proportionality calculation (in ethics, if not in law)
and we take the broader strategic context into account, as well as the possible
interactions of naval, ground, and air forces, it once more appears that making
judgments of proportionality is fiendishly difficult and requires knowledge of the
world and reasoning capacities that computer systems currently lack and seem
likely to continue to lack for the foreseeable future.68 Thus, at the very least, proportionality appears to remain a more difficult issue for AWSs in naval warfare
than distinction.
SECTION 7: AWSS, “SUPERVISED AUTONOMY,” AND
PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK
Of course, human beings also have significant limitations when it comes to
their capacity to achieve distinction and make judgments of proportionality, so
it might be argued that machines eventually will be able to perform at least as
well as humans at these tasks.69 This is an empirical matter. However, there is
also a deeper philosophical question involved regarding the nature and force
of the ethical imperatives underpinning the requirements of jus in bello. While
human beings often fail to behave ethically, when it comes to the duty to avoid

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016

NWC_Autumn2016Review.indb 67

19

9/15/16 12:47 PM

68

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 4, Art. 7

taking human life unnecessarily, morality demands perfection. Consequently, it
might be argued that there is something troubling about justifying the use of an
autonomous weapon solely on the basis that it makes as few mistakes as or fewer
mistakes than the alternative.70
We cannot hope to settle these questions here. Indeed, the authors well may
disagree upon them.71 A partial solution to both the problem of distinction and
proportionality might be achieved by requiring AWSs to seek input from a human
supervisor whenever the risks of attacking an illegitimate target exceed some
predetermined threshold. A number of authorities already advocate “supervised
autonomy” as a way of attempting to combine the benefits of autonomous operations and human decision making in complex environments.72 Yet this proposal
has obvious limitations. To begin with, it presumes that the task of accurately
assessing the risk of inadvertently attacking an illegitimate target is easier than
identifying a potential target as legitimate or not in the first place, which may
not be the case. Perhaps more importantly, relying on human supervision to
carry out combat operations ethically would sacrifice two of the key benefits of
autonomous operations. It would require maintaining a robust communications
infrastructure sufficient to allow the AWS to transmit the relevant data to a base
station and receive instructions from the human operator, which is especially
challenging in the context of operations under water. It also would jeopardize
the capacity of autonomous systems to conduct stealthy operations. In particular,
submersibles would need to transmit and receive signals in real time—and thus
risk giving away their locations—to allow a human supervisor to provide input
to their decisions. While supervised autonomy may be a solution in the context
of operations against technologically unsophisticated adversaries without the
capacity to contest the electronic battle space or launch kinetic attacks against
communications infrastructure, it seems unlikely to be an attractive solution in
the longer term.
There is, however, a further complexity here. The jus in bello principles of
distinction and proportionality not only distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate targets but also demand that warfighters make all feasible efforts
to avoid attacking illegitimate targets in circumstances in which, for various
reasons, it is difficult for them to distinguish between the two. Thus, as the San
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea notes,
warfighters “must take all feasible measures to gather information which will
assist in determining whether or not objects which are not military objectives
are present in an area of attack” and “take all feasible precautions in the choice
of methods and means to avoid or minimize collateral casualties or damage.”73
While the question of what sorts of measures or precautions are “feasible” in a
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given context is obviously complex and often controversial, the level of risk to
warfighters involved in the various options available to them is clearly relevant:
there must be some limit to the amount of risk that we can reasonably expect
warfighters to take on to achieve any given degree of confidence about the nature
of the targets they intend to attack. The fact that no human lives would be placed
at risk—directly (see below)—by requiring autonomous UUVs and USVs to take
any given sort of actions to minimize the chance of inadvertently attacking civilian targets or causing disproportionate casualties suggests that the requirements
to take “all feasible measures” and “all feasible precautions” might be significantly
more demanding for these systems.
Thus, for instance, unmanned submersibles might be required to launch sensor buoys, use active sonar, or even surface to facilitate identification of targets.
Indeed, AWSs might even be required to await authorization from a human
supervisor before carrying out an attack.74 According to the strongest version of
this line of argument, fully autonomous operations of a UUV or USV (or, one
suspects, any AWS) would be unethical.
There are two obvious ways in which this conclusion might be resisted. First,
given the military utility of unmanned systems—and an argument from military
necessity—it might be argued that the risk to the “vessel,” regardless of the absence of any crew on board, is properly relevant to judgments about feasibility:
it would be unreasonable to include in the range of “feasible” precautions those
that likely would result in the destruction of the system if carried out during an
engagement. Second (in addition), while exposing an unmanned system to risk
may not threaten any lives directly, the destruction of the vessel would jeopardize
the safety of friendly forces who might have been relying on it to carry out its mission. Thus, human lives may well be at stake when we risk the safety of a UMS.
These two considerations speak in favor of allowing autonomous systems to
prioritize their own “safety” over the safety of those whose lives they potentially
threaten through their targeting decisions.
The capacity of UMSs to take more precautions prior to launching an attack
often is cited as an argument in favor of developing and deploying them.75 The
fact that they are unmanned means that they plausibly might be used in morerisky operations to try to achieve any worthwhile goal. Perversely, when the goal
is the preservation of the lives of noncombatants, this might even mean placing
(what would otherwise be) autonomous systems at risk by requiring them to
seek authorization for each attack from a human operator. Yet this would vitiate
many of the military advantages of autonomous operations, including the extent
to which the use of UMSs reduces the risk to the lives of friendly forces.76 The
advent of armed autonomous systems therefore will require a potentially difficult
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conversation within the international community about the balance to be struck
between military necessity and humanitarian considerations and about the role
of human supervision of autonomous systems in securing this balance.77
SECTION 8: RESCUE
While the details of what is needed to satisfy the requirements of discrimination
and proportionality may differ somewhat in naval warfare from war on land or
in the air, these principles themselves apply to all warfare by virtue of their place
at the heart of the doctrine of jus in bello. However, the duty of rescue that exists
in the context of war at sea is especially stringent in, if not entirely unique to,
naval warfare.78
We have suggested that, even in wartime, all vessels are ethically required to
render aid to and attempt to rescue individuals lost at sea, regardless of their
nationality, when they have the capacity to do so and as long as doing so would not
jeopardize the safety of the vessel and those on board. Both clauses in the italicized
caveat merit some discussion in the context of the operations of UUVs and USVs.
Whether this duty of assistance will impinge on the operations of USVs and
UUVs will depend on whether we think these systems have, or should have, the
capacity to conduct rescue operations. For instance, the fact that cruise missiles
have no capacity to rescue those rendered helpless in the water after an attack is
not thought to rule out their use in attacks on ships. It therefore seems likely that
some AWSs—particularly those that we are inclined to classify as weapons, such
as “smart” long-loiter-time torpedoes—will be excused from any obligation in
this regard. However, when it comes to the operations of (currently hypothetical)
larger autonomous USVs and UUVs, themselves armed with weapons—those it
would be more natural to regard as vessels—the question will arise whether they
should be required to have at least some capacity to conduct rescue operations.
Even if such vessels were, as seems likely, incapable of taking prisoners on board,
they might be provided with the capacity to launch inflatable life rafts or deploy
emergency locator beacons to draw the attention of other vessels to the presence
of people requiring rescue. In all likelihood, the costs associated with fitting such
systems would be significant in terms of the military utility of the vessel, not least
because deploying them might give away the location of a submersible. What
seems clear, though, is that vessels without this capacity would be significantly
less capable of achieving proportionality in attack. It might even be argued that
the deployment of armed autonomous vessels without the ability to contribute to
rescue operations would be unethical on this basis.79
Like the concepts of “feasible precautions” and “feasible measures” in attack,
the duty of rescue is qualified with reference to the risk involved in attempting to
provide assistance. Thus, because any attempt to provide assistance while combat
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is ongoing in the area would expose a vessel to a high risk of destruction by other
enemy ships, in wartime this duty is understood to exist only “after an engagement.”80 However if UUVs or—more plausibly—USVs did have the capacity to
conduct rescue operations, they might be held to be under a stronger obligation
to do so than manned vessels simply because doing so, even in the course of a
military engagement, would not endanger any human lives directly. Acknowledging this fact may even strengthen the intuition that AWSs should be provided with
the capacity to conduct rescue operations.
Again, focusing on the safety of the vessel rather than that of its (nonexistent)
crew, the lives of friendly combatants elsewhere (which might be threatened if
the UUV or USV was destroyed), or both might provide grounds to resist this
conclusion. We certainly expect that states deploying armed autonomous vessels will be reluctant to risk those vessels’ destruction by programming them to
provide assistance to enemy combatants lost at sea. Nevertheless, we expect it
will be tough to sell the international community on prioritizing the “safety” of a
machine over the lives of human beings lost at sea. Whether autonomous UUVs
and USVs should be required to have some capacity to provide assistance to those
lost at sea and the extent of their obligation to provide this assistance when they
do have the capacity to do so are key questions to be answered by further research
on this topic.
We are conscious that our deliberations have raised more questions than they
have answered. We cannot claim that this survey of the main issues is exhaustive;
there are undoubtedly further issues to be considered than those we have had the
opportunity to discuss here.
Nevertheless, our investigations suggest that the distinctive ethical character
of war at sea generates a number of novel ethical dilemmas regarding the design
and use of UUVs and USVs, dilemmas that do not arise for unmanned systems
operating in the air or on land. In particular, the importance of freedom of navigation on the high seas and the obligation to come to the aid of those shipwrecked
or lost at sea pose difficult challenges for the ethical operation of UUVs and
USVs, especially armed and autonomous systems. Moreover, some of the ethical
issues that do arise regarding the (hypothetical) operations of armed autonomous
systems more generally are differently inflected in the context of war on and
under the seas, including the implications of the requirements of proportionality
and distinction for the operations of these systems.
Finally, what seems clear to both authors, despite specific differences, is that
much more work remains to be done to resolve the question whether—or perhaps which—UUVs and USVs should be conceptualized as vessels or weapons,
and to settle the role that should be accorded to legal conventions and historical
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debates about mine warfare in shaping future practice regarding UUVs. The fact
that such systems blur the lines between weapons platforms and weapons means
that ethical as well as legal frameworks may need to be rethought and refined in
the pursuit of an appropriate balance between the demands of military necessity
and humanitarian concerns in the naval warfare of the future.
We hope that our discussion of these issues here will prove a useful starting
point for future research into these questions.
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